

**A CRITICAL PERIOD FOR
ENSURING STABILITY IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE**

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A CRITICAL PERIOD FOR ENSURING STABILITY IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The coming to power of the elected President Ouattara should not mask reality. Côte d'Ivoire remains fragile and unstable. The atrocities after the second round of the presidential elections on 28 November 2010 and Laurent Gbagbo's attempt to retain power by all means despite losing exacerbated already acute tensions. The next months are crucial. The new government must not underestimate the threats that will long jeopardise peace and must avoid the narcotic of power that has caused so many disastrous decisions over recent decades. The international community must keep careful watch during the transition and stay involved with security, the economy and humanitarian aid. The president must make courageous decisions on security, justice, political dialogue and economic revival, imbuing each with a spirit of national reconciliation.

Security is the first challenge. The murderous events between December 2010 and April 2011 shattered the security apparatus. The military hierarchy was split between desperate, violent Gbagbo defenders, his less zealous supporters, discreet Ouattara supporters and opportunists, all in an atmosphere of mistrust. The new Forces républicaines (FRCI) remains an uncertain project. The priority is to integrate several thousand Forces Nouvelles (FN) fighters into the new army.

The FN former rebels, who helped Ouattara take power by force in Abidjan, play a disproportionate role in the FRCI. Soldiers from Prime Minister Soro's movement dominate Abidjan and the west, in addition to the north of the country they controlled for the last eight years. They are badly trained, disorderly and commanded by warlords not in a good position to establish rule of law. If the government cannot prevail over FN area commanders quickly and re-establish order before the legislative elections, the president's standing will be irreparably damaged. Large numbers of weapons must be surrendered – an arsenal that threatens not only Côte d'Ivoire, but also Liberia, Ghana and all members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is, however, not taking a very proactive role in this matter.

In a country where more than 3,000 were killed in five months, often cruelly and not in combat, reconciliation and justice are imperative. This is the second priority. Promised by Ouattara even before the post-electoral conflict, the Dialogue, Reconciliation and Truth Commission was created with ex-Prime Minister Banny at its head. The civil society consultations he began, his enthusiastic approach and the government's attempt to clarify the mandate in July have not erased doubts about its independence. Quick changes are needed if it is to have adequate credibility.

The government seems to be focusing on punishing the defeated. Several Gbagbo associates have been charged, and the justice system is investigating economic crimes of his clan. There is no doubt about the seriousness of crimes committed by Gbagbo's military and civilian allies before and during the crisis or the need for investigation. But no charges have yet been brought against supporters of the new president who also committed serious crimes. Statements by President Ouattara at home and abroad, notably in the U.S., clearly indicate a desire for impartial justice. The moment has come to translate intention into action that is politically risky but necessary.

The third challenge is to resist the temptation to over-centralise power, leaving no room for political opposition. Electorally, then militarily defeated, Gbagbo's Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) is in shock. Ouattara must create conditions for normalisation of political life by creating space for ex-Gbagbo supporters and others to organise opposition to the government. All political forces, including supporters of FPI ideology, should be able to organise for the legislative elections scheduled to be held by year's end, if they renounce violence and hate rhetoric.

The revival of a badly damaged economy is the fourth challenge. On paper, this seems the simplest. Donors are ready to help a country with much potential, that has been the world's leading cocoa producer for decades, has more recently become an oil producer and has good infrastructure and human resources. Ouattara is reputed to be a careful economist and manager, but his team must abandon

corrupt practices that have curbed economic development for decades and fuelled the frustration of those not invited to the table. And he must not rely exclusively on economic and social policy and a new style of governance to promote national reconciliation.

The international community must help make a smooth passage through a delicate period. The UN mission (UNOCI), whose mandate was renewed for one year by Security Council Resolution 2000 (27 July), must assist in filling the security vacuum in Abidjan and the west. The continued deployment of UNOCI military and police, including reinforcements authorised for the post-electoral crisis, and the opening of new military camps along the Liberian border are welcome. However, more is needed. UNOCI peacekeepers must increase patrols, work with the civilian authorities and the local population and coordinate deployment of the blue helmets with humanitarian agency personnel. Finally, the UN must work with Côte d'Ivoire's international partners and the government to quickly re-establish the police and gendarmerie forces.

At the political level, the UN must help install a climate favourable to holding legislative elections by promoting dialogue between all Ivorian parties. The Secretary-General's Special Representative should define new criteria for his mandate to certify those elections. He could also work to prevent and mitigate local conflicts by focusing on his roles as mediator, facilitator and adviser to the government. And in the short term, the UN, African organisations and donors must prioritise economic development projects that also promote reconciliation, with emphasis on the regions and communities most affected by the recent conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

For Security

To the Defence and Interior Ministers:

1. Begin withdrawing the Forces Nouvelles from Abidjan by the beginning of September, except for personnel selected and trained by the Integrated Command Centre (Centre de Commandement Intégré, CCI) during the peace process, starting with:
 - a) the civilian volunteers recruited during the post-electoral crisis, who should be redeployed into community service or employed in a national program of major infrastructure development; followed by
 - b) area commanders and their units.
2. Repeat the call for military personnel to return from exile and provide guarantees for their security and rights, including the presumption of innocence.

3. Respect the provisions of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (APO) scrupulously, especially with regard to the number of ex-rebels integrated into the new security forces.
4. Establish a procedure to select soldier, police and gendarme candidates for the reunified army, excluding those implicated in serious human rights and international humanitarian law abuse.

To the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI):

5. Deploy more members in Abidjan so as to fill the security vacuum left by an FN withdrawal and conduct nocturnal land and air patrols along the Liberian border, in cooperation with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).
6. Establish a collection program in districts of Abidjan and the west most affected by weapons proliferation; create a reward mechanism for communities that help recover the most.
7. Ensure integration of the peacekeeping operation and the entire UN system, in particular coordinated deployment of blue helmets and humanitarian agency personnel engaged in restoring basic social infrastructure.

For Reconciliation and Justice

To the President of the Republic:

8. Consider changes to the 13 July 2011 decree on the Dialogue, Reconciliation and Truth Commission (CDVR), after structured consultation and a listening exercise that takes into account criticisms by the main civil society human rights organisations and West African and international NGOs with expertise on transitional justice elsewhere in the world.
9. Request the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor to extend his investigation to include war crimes and crimes against humanity committed since September 2002.

To the Ivorian Government:

10. Involve prefects, sub-prefects and mayors in the initiatives led by local reconciliation committees and, with donor help, provide these committees with appropriate funding.
11. Meet with senior media figures to discuss their inclusion in national reconciliation work.
12. Do not use judicial procedures to dismantle the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI); distinguish between supporters of the ex-president who actively participated in serious crimes and those who were only associated with his illegal exercise of power after the election.

13. Prioritise re-establishment of courts in the centre, north and west and Guiglo and appoint competent judges throughout the country.

To the Justice Ministry:

14. Ensure that investigations are opened into members of the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) suspected of serious crimes, especially those named in the report of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d'Ivoire.

To the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC):

15. Determine whether crimes within ICC jurisdiction were committed after 19 September 2002 and, if so, request the judges to expand the investigatory scope to 2002-2011.

On Politics and the Legislative Elections

To the Ivorian government:

16. Resist the temptation to further weaken the party of Gbagbo and his followers; and create the atmosphere of peace that is indispensable to allow them to prepare for the legislative elections.
17. Organise legislative elections by the end of 2011 on the basis of an agreement with all political parties about their conduct, especially concerning the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), the electoral list and the UN role.

To the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General:

18. Facilitate dialogue between Ivorian parties so as to promote peaceful, inclusive elections.

On the Economy

To the Ivorian government:

19. Undertake labour-intensive infrastructure work, including repair of main roads and projects in smaller towns/villages most affected by the post-electoral crisis, especially in the far west.
20. Give displaced persons urgent support, especially in the west; set up a fund to help them return home, thus avoiding indefinite residence in camps.
21. Make economic choices whenever possible that also promote political reconciliation.

To the civilian and military leaders of the Forces Nouvelles:

22. Dismantle the economic control mechanisms in the centre, north and west, including by:
 - a) ending tax collection imposed on markets and all other forms of parallel taxation;
 - b) closing any remaining check-points;
 - c) returning all service stations to their legitimate owners;
 - d) re-establishing Ivorian customs posts on the northern borders; and
 - e) vacating all administrative premises occupied since the rebellion of September 2002.

Dakar/Brussels, 1 August 2011

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I. INTRODUCTION

The second round of the 28 November 2010 presidential elections pitted Alassane Ouattara, candidate of the Union of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP)¹ against Laurent Gbagbo, outgoing president and candidate of the Presidential Majority (LMP). Ouattara won the election with 54.1 per cent of the votes but Gbagbo did not accept the result announced by the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) and certified by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). He therefore manipulated the Constitutional Council to stay in power. Headed by a Gbagbo associate, the Council cancelled more than 660,000 votes in seven departments favourable to Ouattara and proclaimed Gbagbo the winner with 51.4 per cent of the votes against 45.9 per cent for his opponent.²

Gbagbo then conducted a campaign of terror against Ouattara's supporters in order to stifle protest, while the latter allied himself with the former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles (FN).³ After several months of clashes in Abidjan and elsewhere between FN forces and army units and militias loyal to Gbagbo, Ouattara launched a countrywide military offensive on 28 March 2011. This victorious offensive led to Gbagbo's arrest on 11 April and was facilitated by the direct intervention of UN and French Force Licorne helicopters, as authorised by Security Council Resolution 1975, to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population.⁴

After five months of clashes, President Ouattara has inherited a wounded and unstable country. Before the second round of the presidential election, it was already clear that the future head of state would face a major challenge. After the tragic events that unfolded after the election that was supposed to end the country's crisis, the work required is immense. The post-electoral crisis weakened the new president's position. While he initially counted on working with his political allies in the RHDP, he is now also encumbered by military allies. His alliance with the FN strengthened the position of the former rebels and their leader, Guillaume Soro, who he appointed prime minister on 5 December 2010.⁵ Masters of the north, the FN made a significant contribution to Ouattara's victory and established positions throughout the country for an indefinite period. FN troops are particularly numerous in Abidjan, the centre of power, where they are responsible for ensuring security.

The conflict's other major political consequence was the total defeat of outgoing president Gbagbo's camp. An important political actor for three decades and president for ten years,⁶ he has now been removed from public life and is under house arrest, like his associates, and awaiting national and international legal proceedings against him.⁷ Having come out on top in the first round of the presidential election with 38 per cent of votes and having increased his share to 46 per cent in the second round, Gbagbo could have spared himself and his colleagues such a disastrous outcome. They lost everything because they were prepared to use all means possible to stay in power even though they came second at the ballot box. If they had accepted electoral defeat, they would have been able to put it behind them and persuade sectors of national and African public opinion that the new president was equally to blame for the mini-civil war in March and April 2011.

¹ Created in May 2005, the RHDP includes four political parties: the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), the Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), the Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d'Ivoire (UDPCI) and the Mouvement des forces d'avenir (MFA).

² For details and analysis of the post-electoral crisis between December 2010 and March 2011, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°171, *Côte d'Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?*, 3 March 2011.

³ Ibid.

⁴ The resolution also imposed individual sanctions on Laurent Gbagbo and his associates and warned that attacks by his forces could amount to crimes against humanity, which would

come under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

⁵ Laurent Gbagbo appointed Gilbert-Marie Aké N'Gbo as prime minister on the same day, giving Côte d'Ivoire two competing governments.

⁶ From 26 October 2000 to 4 December 2010.

⁷ Gbagbo is under house arrest in the town of Korhogo. His wife, Simone, is detained at Odienné. Pascal Affi N'Guessan, former general secretary of the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), Gbagbo's party, is detained at Bouna.

Scarred by atrocities against civilians and violent fighting,⁸ the post-electoral period aggravated community tensions and added a humanitarian aspect to the many problems already facing the country. On 15 June 2011, more than 350,000 people were still displaced in Côte d'Ivoire.⁹ The epicentre of this humanitarian crisis is in the west, on the border with Liberia, where the already present ethnic tensions were exacerbated by the terrible crimes by pro-Gbagbo militia and then the FN, supported by *dozos* (traditional hunters).

The shockwave of violence gave a new regional and international dimension to the Ivorian crisis. In mid-June, no fewer than thirteen African countries were providing shelter for 200,000 Ivorian refugees.¹⁰ Fragile as it is, Liberia has had to take in most of these refugees through its eastern border.¹¹ Monrovia also has to consider the danger posed by the return of armed Liberian mercenaries who have recently been involved in violence. Ghana, where Gbagbo supporters have gone into exile, has now become involved in a crisis it had previously managed to avoid.

France, which played a decisive role in Ouattara's military victory, has decided to maintain a long-term military presence in Côte d'Ivoire and to assist with reform of the Ivorian security system.¹² This will not help to alter many Ivorians' perception that the new president is an ally of France or even beholden to it. However, Ouattara seems happy enough to accept this closeness to France and, more generally, to Western powers, while at the same time pointing out, when need be, that he was elected by Ivorians. International community support

was undoubtedly crucial in helping him overcome Gbagbo's fierce resistance. However, after directly participating in the final battle for Abidjan, and following widespread criticism, the UN has decided to evaluate its role in the crisis.¹³

The most important thing for Côte d'Ivoire right now is the immediate future and the extent of Ouattara's chances of ushering in a new era of peace, rather than the next stage of an interminable crisis. The coming months will provide a unique window of opportunity. As a diplomat interviewed by Crisis Group said: "several important reforms, especially reform of the security apparatus, will be much more difficult to carry out once the situation returns to normal and old practices are re-established".¹⁴

⁸ According to the UN, the fighting between December 2010 and April 2011 left 3,000 dead. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d'Ivoire, June 2011.

⁹ Communiqué of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 15 June 2011.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The Liberian president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, said the refugees still numbered 130,000 at the end of June 2011. "Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf: pourquoi je suis candidate", *Jeune Afrique*, 26 June 2011.

¹² President Nicolas Sarkozy announced on 24 June that between 200 and 250 French military personnel would be stationed at Port-Bouët. On 27 May, in an interview on Radio Europe 1, Ouattara said he had asked Paris to keep the Force Licorne in the country and reactivate the base of the 43rd Marine Infantry Battalion (BIMA), dissolved on 3 June 2009. Six days earlier, in a speech at the investiture of President Ouattara, Nicolas Sarkozy said: "France will contribute to reform of the Ivorian army ... we will continue to station military forces here, to ensure protection of French citizens". The French Minister of Defence, Gérard Longuet, visited Côte d'Ivoire on 27 June and proposed a review of the defence agreement between the two countries.

¹³ UNOCI attracted criticism from several internal and external sources. Amnesty International criticised UNOCI for not providing enough protection to the civilian population. See *They Looked at His Identity Card and Shot Him Dead*, published on 25 May 2011. The discovery of large stocks of heavy weapons at the presidential residence after Gbagbo's arrest raised questions about UNOCI's capacity to enforce the UN arms embargo imposed in 2004. Crisis Group interviews, NGO staff, Abidjan, Dakar, February 2010 and May and June 2011.

¹⁴ Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Brussels, May 2011.

II. THE SECURITY CHALLENGE

A. FRAGMENTED FORCES

Until 17 March 2011, two separate armed forces controlled Côte d'Ivoire. The Defence and Security Forces (FDS), with 55,000 men, under the command of the president¹⁵ and the former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles army (FAFN) with about 10,000 men.¹⁶ At the beginning of the post-electoral crisis, most senior officers in the FDS pledged their allegiance to the outgoing president, while the FAFN lined up behind Ouattara. As the crisis unfolded, part of the FDS went over to Ouattara, another part remained loyal to Gbagbo and a third part preferred to desert. On 17 March, the president-elect, still holed up in the Golf Hotel, Abidjan, announced the creation of the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire – FRCI),¹⁷ composed of FDS elements who had come over to his side and the former rebel forces of the FN.¹⁸

One month after it was created, the FRCI is still suffering from a serious lack of cohesiveness and the absence

of a centralised command structure. Many senior FDS officers, close to Laurent Gbagbo, have been arrested or removed and a few of them have been killed.¹⁹ Retired officers have been recalled to try and fill the gap.²⁰ General Philippe Mangou continued to serve as chief of staff but his office was occupied by General Soumaïla Bakayoko, FAFN chief of staff after Gbagbo's defeat. Bakayoko was finally appointed as FRCI chief of staff on 7 July.

At least two command structures exist within the FRCI. One of them includes former FDS officers who transferred their allegiance to Ouattara soon after the post-electoral crisis or just before Gbagbo's fall. The other is composed of former rebel leaders. Not surprisingly, these two structures do not share the same vision of what their role should be.

The senior FDS officers who transferred their allegiance to Ouattara just before or just after Gbagbo's defeat are not trusted by FN officers or FDS officers who joined the Ouattara camp early in the crisis.²¹ On the FN side, the area commanders and some of the movement's military leaders have taken up important positions in the FRCI hierarchy, especially in Abidjan.²² They are looked down on by some senior FDS officers – career soldiers attached to the principles of hierarchy and who do not recognise their (FN's) right to give orders.²³ The area commanders reply that they made

¹⁵ This figure published by the UN in January 2011 includes the entire Ivorian security apparatus: soldiers, gendarmes, police officers, customs officers and forest rangers.

¹⁶ With the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (APO), 4 March 2007, President Gbagbo and the FN general secretary, Guillaume Soro, agreed to "restructure and reorganise the two armies in order to create new defence and security forces true to the republican values of integrity and morality". In this new context, the FN became an "ex-rebel force". The exact strength of the FN was never known and estimates vary in accordance with source and time from 10,000 to 35,000 men. Until the post-electoral crisis, the first figure was certainly closer to the truth. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°62, *Côte d'Ivoire: What's Needed to End the Crisis*, 2 July 2009.

¹⁷ President Ouattara announced the creation of the FRCI and signed an ordinance "on the unification of the national armed forces and the FN armed forces". With this step, he sought to achieve several objectives. First, to acquire legitimacy by creating an army representing the whole country. Second, to conform to legality by implementing APO provisions on the reunification of the Ivorian army. Third, no doubt, to prepare the offensive launched eleven days later against Gbagbo.

¹⁸ The FN is divided into sub-groups. Some units, such as the one led by Commander Chérif Ousmane, are older and well-structured units. But in addition to these units and their area commanders, the FN has thousands of new fighters, including civilian volunteers, hastily recruited soldiers, transport workers rounding off their working week by manning check-points and even released prisoners. On 7 June, former FAFN chief of staff, Soumaïla Bakayoko, said that former common law prisoners had impersonated FRCI fighters and committed atrocities against civilians. "Des anciens prisonniers en tenues militaires commettent des exactions contre les populations", *Afriinfos.com*, 8 June 2011.

¹⁹ General Dogbo Blé, former commander of the Republican Guard, is detained in Korhogo. Vice-Admiral Vagba Faussignaux and Captain Boniface Konan have fled. On 28 June, the Abidjan military prosecutor laid charges against 49 senior army officers. Official sources claim that Colonel Major Nathanaël Brouaha Ehouman, commander of the Presidential Security Group (GSPR), was killed in a clash between Liberian mercenaries and FRCI soldiers who had arrested him in his home village and were taking him to Abidjan.

²⁰ Crisis Group interviews, Ivorian army officers, May 2011.

²¹ Captain Alla Kouakou Léon, Colonel Major Gaston Mian and Colonel Patrice Kouassi were among the first officers to transfer their allegiance to Ouattara between January and March 2011.

²² Several area commanders share control of Abidjan. Issiaka Ouattara controls Marcory, Koumassi, Port-Bouët and Treichville. Chérif Ousmane controls Plateau and Adjamé. Morou Ouattara, Hervé Touré, Ousmane Coulibaly and Gaoussou Koné share the rest of the city (Cocody, Yopougon, Abobo, Anyama and Attécoubé). Also present in Abidjan are other important members of the movement, such as Tuo Fozié, director general of the FAFN Police, Zacharia Koné, former commander of Séguéla, and Mamadou Bamba, chief of the *dozos* and leader of the Warriors of Light (*Guerriers de la lumière*) unit at the start of the rebellion. Finally, some districts or sub-districts are under the control of junior figures who tend to remain autonomous. Crisis Group interviews, Ivorian army and FN officers, May 2011.

²³ This has been a recurrent problem since the APO was signed. The senior ranks of the FDS disapprove of how some area commanders, who took up arms against the Republic when they were only young non-commissioned officers, have been promoted to

the biggest contribution to Ouattara's military victory and the nation ought therefore to be grateful to them.²⁴

The situation in the rank and file is not much better. At the end of May, there were an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 deserters from the army, the police force and the gendarmerie. Some are hiding in the interior of the country, while others have found refuge in Ghana or Liberia.²⁵ A minority of these exiles have committed violent crimes against civilians; the majority were only obeying orders or are not guilty of any wrongdoing. These men fear for their safety, either because of their ethnic identity or because they belonged to a unit too closely associated with Gbagbo. This is the case for members of the Republican Guard, to which about half of the military personnel in exile belonged.²⁶ Contacts have been established at several levels of the military hierarchy to encourage their return.²⁷ However, they are still too afraid to return and some of them believe they will not be able to do so for at least several months.²⁸

Neither does the FRCI have the resources it needs to do its work. In Abidjan, for example, police stations were wrecked or damaged in the fighting.²⁹ Other installations are occupied by FN personnel who do not want to vacate them.³⁰ Many uniforms have been destroyed and weapons dispersed. Entire units have been dissolved but not yet replaced by the new government.³¹ Gendarmes

senior positions of the same rank as themselves. Crisis Group interviews, Ivorian army officers, February 2010.

²⁴ "Organisation de la nouvelle armée: le sort réservé aux chefs de guerre", *L'Inter*, 28 June 2011.

²⁵ These deserters number several thousand, including more than 2,000 former members of the Republican Guard. At the end of June, the Ministry of Defence was drawing up a list of these soldiers. Crisis Group interviews, Ivorian army and UNOCI officers, Abidjan, May 2011.

²⁶ Crisis Group interviews, Ivorian army and UNOCI officers, Abidjan, May 2011.

²⁷ One of the emissaries of the facilitator Blaise Compaoré led a mission in May during which he met Ivorian army officers in exile in Ghana. At a more junior level, police officers and gendarmes in exile or in hiding are in contact with some of their colleagues from the opposing camp with a view to arranging a "secure" return. Crisis Group interviews, diplomat and local politicians, May 2011.

²⁸ Crisis Group communication, former pro-government militia leaders, May 2011.

²⁹ Crisis Group interviews, residents of Yopougon, gendarmes, army officers, Abidjan, May and June 2011.

³⁰ "Des policiers expulsés par des éléments FRCI", *Soir Info*, 21 June 2011.

³¹ The Republican Guard (Compagnie républicaine de sécurité – CRS), the Anti-Riot Brigade (Brigade anti-émeutes – BAE), the Mobile Rapid Intervention Unit (Détachement mobile d'intervention rapide – DEMIR) and the Special Security Command Centre (Centre de commandement des

and police officers are present at road checkpoints in the centre and west of the country, but the situation is different in the economic capital, Abidjan, where former rebel soldiers now in the FRCI are clearly in the majority.³² Here, the FRCI find it difficult to ensure security. Many former FN fighters receive no pay. The FRCI has no distinctive uniform and clearly suffers from a lack of professionalism.³³ These soldiers find it difficult to coexist with their new brothers in arms who used to serve in the FDS.³⁴

The FRCI's presence has certainly restored a relative calm to Abidjan, first because of the vigorous and sometimes bloody operations to flush out pro-Gbagbo militia and mercenaries in the two weeks following 11 April, and second, because of the nocturnal road checks. However, too many FRCI soldiers are also committing offences that range from the extortion of a few coins to organised crime such as burglaries or car theft.³⁵ More seriously, FRCI soldiers are also committing extrajudicial executions³⁶ and organising reprisals against presumed supporters of the deposed president.³⁷ These crimes exacerbate tensions in the community, perpetuate a climate of fear and weaken the executive power. President Ouattara is in an awkward position vis-à-vis the warlords who helped him take power. Prime Minister Guillaume Soro is in an even more delicate position, caught between a president who wants a rapid return to order and former rebel colleagues who would like to continue looting and acting with impunity.

Efforts are being made to reorganise the FRCI and some encouraging results have been achieved. In June, many check-

opérations de sécurité – CECOS) were all dissolved in May 2011. The BAE and CRS bases could be used as FRCI barracks. Crisis Group communication, army officer, July 2011.

³² Abidjanis have christened these elements "frères Cissé", a play on words based on the phonetic similarity of FRCI and the name Cissé, which is very common in the north of the country.

³³ Attempts have been made to integrate FN soldiers into the FRCI by distributing black or yellow T-shirts with FRCI on them. However, only a minority of FN soldiers have them.

³⁴ Violent clashes occurred on 22 June 2011 in the Abidjan district of Yopougon between the FRCI and gendarmes in the ex-FDS. These clashes left one dead. "Côte d'Ivoire: affrontements à l'arme lourde entre FRCI et ex-FDS à Abidjan", *Jeune Afrique.com*, 23 June 2011.

³⁵ For example, some FN army officers receive stolen cars. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, May 2011.

³⁶ The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report "Gbagbo supporters tortured, killed in Abidjan", 2 June 2011, accuses the FRCI of killing 149 Gbagbo supporters who had not been involved in fighting since 11 April.

³⁷ On 5 June, FRCI soldiers organised a reprisal against the location of Yakassé-Mé in the south-eastern region of Agnéby, considered to be an electoral stronghold of Laurent Gbagbo. "Descente punitive des éléments FRCI: le chef de terre de Yakassé-Mé trouve la mort", *Soir Info*, 17 June 2011.

points were dismantled in Abidjan and the interior.³⁸ However, progress is slow and FRCI crimes continue.³⁹ No judicial proceedings have yet been opened against the perpetrators of these crimes.⁴⁰ The government has made no announcement about withdrawing the FN from Abidjan and so its stay is indefinite. The government finds it difficult to impose respect for republican order on the FN military leaders, some of whom seem incapable of understanding the messages sent to them, especially the appeals for restraint and an end to acts of violence. In the current situation, the immediate threat to the security of the economic capital seems to come more from the victors than from the vanquished.

The first official meeting on reorganising the army, held at Grand-Bassam, near Abidjan, on 24 June, gave rise to a surprising proposal. Paul Koffi Koffi, with special responsibility for this matter at the Ministry of Defence, announced his intention to incorporate 11,000 former rebels into the new army,⁴¹ 2,000 more than provided for by the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (APO), the only document to have made detailed provision for reorganising the new army.⁴² This announcement indicates the influence of the area commanders in the discussion on reorganising the army.⁴³ The proposal raises questions about ethnic balance in the FRCI, the political consequences of incorporating thousands of men loyal to the prime minister and the state's capacity to pay so many extra soldiers over several decades.

There is also a political risk for Ouattara. If he is unable to re-establish order within the next six months, his authority and credibility will be seriously questioned. The choice of General Bakayoko as commander of the FRCI is unfortunate. Even if a desire for political balance is expressed in the appointment of General Firmin Detoh Letoh, commander of land forces under President Gbagbo, as FRCI deputy chief of staff, many Ivoirians will only

note the symbolism represented by the accession of a former rebel leader to the head of the country's regular armed forces. That will also fix in people's minds the idea that Ouattara's election has led to a complete reversal in the balance of political and military forces in favour of the north and northerners. The new government will take an enormous risk if it underestimates the importance of popular perceptions, even when they do not reflect the nuances of reality.

B. MULTIPLE THREATS

Far too many weapons are in circulation in Côte d'Ivoire. This proliferation is an old problem made worse by the post-electoral crisis. Gbagbo supporters distributed hundreds of war weapons and ammunition to the population.⁴⁴ The army has seized large quantities of military supplies.⁴⁵ Gbagbo supporters are not the only ones responsible for the problem. The weapons distributed to FN fighters before the 28 March 2011 offensive are not subject to any control or inventory. In addition, many unexploded munitions represent a danger for the population and contribute to maintaining a climate of insecurity.⁴⁶

The rapid collection of these weapons is a very difficult task. The quantities involved and their dispersal to locations that are not very accessible⁴⁷ complicates the work conducted jointly by the Ministry of Defence and the impartial forces.⁴⁸ Despite government calls to surrender these weapons, many people hesitate because they feel they will need them to

³⁸ "Des barrages des FRCI sur l'axe Agboville-Abidjan démantelés", Agence France-Presse, 21 June 2011.

³⁹ On 23 June, UNOCI said that "FRCI soldiers killed at least eight people" in one week. "Huit personnes tuées par les forces pro-Ouattara", Agence-France Presse, 23 June 2011.

⁴⁰ In a communiqué dated 15 June 2011, HRW said that "no member of the Republican Forces has been arrested or detained for grave post-election crimes".

⁴¹ These include 8,700 ex-rebels and 2,300 volunteers recruited during the post-electoral crisis.

⁴² Annex IV of the APO provided for the incorporation of 9,000 FN soldiers in the security forces, with 5,000 joining the national army and 4,000 joining the police and gendarmerie, including 600 men selected after the Pretoria Accord, April 2005.

⁴³ Three area commanders attended this meeting: Chérif Ousmane, Issiaka Ouattara and Hervé Touré. "Organisation de la nouvelle armée: le sort réservé au chef de guerre", op. cit.

⁴⁴ Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, politicians, Abidjan residents, May 2011. One of the resistance strategies formulated by the *securocrats* involved distributing war weapons to some of their supporters and establishing arms caches in different parts of Abidjan, in order to prepare for a long period of urban guerrilla warfare.

⁴⁵ For example, the arsenal discovered on 12 June in the Abidjan commune of Attécoubé included three rocket launchers, three shells, seven Kalashnikovs, 50 Kalashnikov magazines, 100 A-52 magazines, 30 12-7 machine gun magazines, 60 grenades, one anti-personnel mine, a hunting rifle and 50 cartridges and 40 magazines for Sig pistols.

⁴⁶ An operation to collect these devices was launched on 6 June in Abidjan by the gendarmerie, supported by the French force Licorne and UNOCI. More than 100 shells and other unexploded munitions were removed within a few days. "Campagne de déminage en Côte d'Ivoire", BBC, 6 June 2011.

⁴⁷ Some weapons are hidden in private homes or have been buried. Crisis Group interviews, Ivorian army officers, Abidjan, May 2011.

⁴⁸ UNOCI, mainly its embargo and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) units and the Force Licorne are involved in the collection, reception and decommissioning of weapons. For example, on 19 May, the Force Licorne delivered to UNOCI about 100 weapons and ammunition cases collected on patrols in Abidjan. "L'ONUCI reçoit des armes et des munitions collectées par la force Licorne", African Press Organisation, 19 May 2011.

protect themselves against real or supposed enemies.⁴⁹ Bitter or intent on revenge, some extremist Gbagbo supporters refuse to divulge any information about hidden weapons.⁵⁰

It is unlikely that there are enough hard-line Gbagbo elements to be able to go on the offensive in the coming months, even if they would like to. It is difficult to see how they might organise themselves in sufficient number to be able to militarily challenge Ouattara and the impartial forces, which are allied to the legal government. The “patriotic” galaxy in Abidjan and the west of the country has been dismantled.⁵¹ The exiles in Ghana are dispersed in a country that has an effective security apparatus.

The situation is more worrying on the border with Liberia, where many members of the former pro-government militias are in hiding along with Liberian mercenary allies who controlled the administrative region of Moyen Cavally. The latter are under a certain degree of surveillance. Liberian police, supported by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), have conducted several raids in recent months.⁵² On the Ivorian side,

UNOCI is organising patrols and aerial surveillance along the 770km border, where the difficult terrain makes it difficult to control the territory.

The threat of incursions into Ivorian territory by the remnants of pro-government militias intent on criminal or political objectives should be taken seriously. These militants were among the most extreme in the patriotic movement. Guilty of serious atrocities, they have nothing to lose and may have contacts among a population subjected to FRCI atrocities, inflicted as collective punishment and targeting especially Guéré communities, presumed to support the former president, who belongs to the related Bété ethnic group.

Not far from the Liberian border, in the two regions of Moyen Cavally and 18 Montagnes, armed groups who defend the interests of immigrant populations also pose a threat. They include *dozos*, traditional hunters who have fought on the side of the rebels since 2002 and are suspected of playing an active role in the massacres at Duékoué (see below).⁵³ According to the prefect of this town, one of these groups currently has 300 members, concentrated in the Mount Péko area.⁵⁴ The presence of these men is a problem on two counts. They are armed and this makes the indigenous communities fearful of going back to their villages.

C. FILL THE SECURITY VACUUM

The current priority is to restore the cohesion of the security apparatus.⁵⁵ This first requires an effective and centralised command structure. The appointment of the FRCI chief of staff and other senior army, gendarmerie and police officers should quickly lead to improvements. It also requires army, police force and gendarmerie personnel who served under the Gbagbo regime to return to their posts. The government should repeat the call for military personnel to return from exile and provide guarantees for their security and rights.

The former FDS constitutes the basis of the new army. It should be quickly integrated with the sub-group of FN soldiers now in the Integrated Command Centre (Centre de

⁴⁹ The Ministry of Defence made several such appeals in the press.

⁵⁰ Crisis Group interview, former leader of the Student and Pupil Federation (Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire – FESCI), Abidjan, May 2011.

⁵¹ This structure was composed of a range of youth organisations and several armed militias. In Abidjan, they met at places called “*agora*” or “*parlements*”. They were very rooted in the university campuses. These campuses were closed at the end of the post-electoral crisis. The main Abidjan *agora*, located in the Plateau district, was demolished. For a more complete description of the patriotic structure, see the Crisis Group Africa Report N° 158, *Côte d'Ivoire: Securing the Electoral Process*, 5 May 2010, pp. 6-11. Also see Richard Banégas, “La République oublie-t-elle ses enfants? Milicianisation et démilicianisation du champ politique en Côte d'Ivoire”, conference organised by the Centre for International Study and Research (Centre d'études et de recherches internationales – CERI), Paris, 25-26 September 2008.

⁵² On 22 May, the Liberian police arrested twelve Liberian mercenaries suspected of having fought on Gbagbo's side. They included Isaac Chegbo, nicknamed Bob Marley. The Liberian courts accuse him of having led 200 mercenaries responsible for atrocities at Bloléquin and Guiglo, in the west of Côte d'Ivoire. “Several mercenaries arrested”, *New Democrat*, 23 May 2011; and “Ivory Coast mercenary ‘Bob Marley’ arrested in Liberia”, *The Guardian*, 15 June 2011. In addition, on 16 June, the Liberian police discovered a large arms cache not far from the border. The Liberian authorities say that the weapons were hidden by pro-Gbagbo militants. The arsenal included grenade launchers, 67 AK-47 rifles and more than 5,000 cartridges. 92 Ivorian refugees were detained and questioned about this arms cache. “Liberia discovers arms cache near Ivory Coast border”, BBC, 17 June 2011.

⁵³ Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d'Ivoire, p. 8, op. cit.

⁵⁴ “Trois cent personnes armées se trouvent dans la forêt classée du mont Péko”, *le Nouveau Réveil*, 27 June 2011. This has been a problematic areas for several years. It is a dense forest where those displaced by the war, especially Burkina Faso nationals, have established illegal camps. For fear of being evicted, they are armed and rely on protection from the *dozos*. Crisis Group interviews, NGO personnel, community representative, Duékoué, 23 February 2010.

⁵⁵ Crisis Group interviews, Ivorian army officers, Abidjan, May 2011.

commandement intégré, CCI)⁵⁶ who already have experience of working with ex-loyalist soldiers, even at a minimal level. In more general terms, in the coming months, the FRCI must settle into a routine, wearing the same uniforms, using the same equipment and operating from the same bases. This phase of normalisation must be accompanied by a selection procedure that excludes elements implicated in serious human rights violations, whether they are former members of the FDS or the FN. It is also imperative that the number of new recruits is limited and therefore in line with APO provisions regarding the number of ex-rebels integrated into the new security forces.

The gradual withdrawal of the FN from several major cities, beginning with Abidjan, is necessary for members of the former FDS to regain their posts, with priority given to the police forces, which are the most important for ensuring the security of property and people in peacetime. This withdrawal, which should not involve FN fighters already in the CCI, is indispensable if the government is going to end violent crime by elements that are difficult to identify. It should begin with those who have had the least training, in particular, volunteers and all those who were hastily recruited for the 28 March 2011 offensive. These men could be re-deployed in the community service program that is currently being reactivated.

The withdrawal should be conducted according to a published timetable and be coordinated with area commanders in Abidjan. It should be followed by the first phase of demobilisation and the return to barracks of FN soldiers fit for the new army and police force, while respecting APO provisions regarding the numbers to be integrated. The process will be completed by the definitive departure of all area commanders from Abidjan who have already begun negotiations with the authorities about their future.⁵⁷ These negotiations should be completed quickly in order to remove the area commanders from the FRCI command structure.

The security vacuum caused by the departure of this important component of the FRCI should be initially filled by a major deployment of UNOCI forces, particularly police officers. The UN Security Council has extended the deployment of 2,400 supplementary blue helmets authorised by the Security Council during the post-electoral crisis and renewed UNOCI's mandate until 31 July 2012.⁵⁸ These additional forces should now be deployed. At the end of June, only 1,024 had been deployed. By deciding to open new military camps in the west,⁵⁹ UNOCI could, a priori, considerably strengthen surveillance of the Liberian border. It's about time. A preventive deployment on this scale could have saved lives in the extreme west during the post-electoral crisis.

UNOCI should now be given the resources it needs to ensure nocturnal surveillance of this very porous border.⁶⁰ Blue helmets stationed in their camps or patrolling the towns while carefully avoiding villages, camps and country roads will not achieve very much. Surveillance of the west of Côte d'Ivoire should have a regional focus, involve UNMIL and maintain the same number of men until after the Ivorian legislative elections scheduled to take place a few months after the Liberian presidential and general elections, which are in turn scheduled for October. UNOCI must ensure that its operations are efficiently coordinated with the entire UN system, especially with regard to the deployment of the blue helmets and humanitarian agency personnel, which should help to quickly put in place basic social infrastructure.⁶¹

The collection of hidden weapons is needed to protect the public and avoid the spread of this equipment in the region. It will not be possible without improving intelligence capabilities of those involved, especially UNOCI personnel. This could be achieved either by distributing individual rewards in exchange for information leading to the discovery of arms caches or by taking a more collective approach and organising a system to reward communities who help to recover the most weapons.⁶²

The proliferation of weapons in Côte d'Ivoire is a serious threat to members of the Economic Community of West Af-

⁵⁶ Created by the APO, the CCI was in charge of organising the merger of the FDS and the FAFN. Commanded by Colonel Nicolas Kouakou (FDS) and Lieutenant-Colonel Karim Ouattara (FAFN), the CCI also had the job of implementing the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program and ensuring security during the presidential election of 2010, operating in mixed units. The APO calculated that 8,000 men (4,000 FDS and 4,000 FAFN) would be needed for this mission, but only 6,500 were finally mobilised. See Crisis Group Briefing N° 77, *Côte d'Ivoire: Finally Escaping the Crisis*, 25 November 2010, p. 4.

⁵⁷ The area commanders were offered four main options: stay in the army; be paid-off; set their sights on election as a deputy; accept a job as military attaché abroad. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, New York, July 2011.

⁵⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2000, 27 July 2011.

⁵⁹ These camps should be open by the end of July 2011 and are located at Bouaflé, Gagnoa, Issia and Sinfra, in the centre-west and Tabou, Taï, Toulépleu and Zouan Hounien along the Liberian border.

⁶⁰ UNOCI does not have the right to conduct nocturnal aerial reconnaissance missions. Its three helicopters can only be used during daylight hours. Crisis Group interview, UN military officer, May 2011.

⁶¹ Crisis Group interview, diplomatic source, 27 July 2011.

⁶² This system, which includes using a rewards system to transfer responsibility for disarmament from individuals to communities, was successfully used by UN agencies in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2006. It has never been tried in Côte d'Ivoire, but it seems well adapted to the country's community structures.

rican States (ECOWAS). They should strengthen their capacity to police their borders in order to prevent these weapons entering their territory. The heads of state of members of the Mano River Union (MRU), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire clearly expressed their willingness to do this at their meeting in Monrovia on 16-17 July. ECOWAS, which already has appropriate instruments for this task, should now support the initiative taken by the MRU, which has much more limited resources.

III. RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE

A. A BLOODY CONFLICT

The post-electoral crisis exacerbated existing antagonisms and released a wave of violence that was to be expected after a decade of fanatical propaganda and hate rhetoric. Without immense efforts at reconciliation, it is to be feared that stored-up resentment will once again lead to massive inter-ethnic violence.

The bloody conflict became more intense during the last few months. It involved the urban and rural communities that have suffered most atrocities, for example the Abidjan commune of Yopougon and the west of the country.⁶³ These two sensitive areas have some things in common: their residents have been directly affected by violence,⁶⁴ have very diverse geographical and ethnic origins and assumptions are commonly made about their political identity and affiliation.⁶⁵ The ethnic groups concerned are, first, native to the west and to part of the lagoon area of the south, electoral strongholds of Laurent Gbagbo and second, groups from the north and from northern neighbours, Burkina Faso and Mali, most of whom support Alassane Ouattara.⁶⁶

The site of land disputes and repeated killings since 2002, Moyen Cavally, where the towns of Duékoué and Guiglo

⁶³ Members of the autochtone ethnic group the Bétés clashed with Guinean and Malian nationals in Sanégaz on the night of 20/21 June. "De violents affrontements entre populations autochtones et allogènes à Sanégaz (Gagnoa)", *Nord Sud*, 22 June 2011.

⁶⁴ The most serious post-electoral violence took place in Duékoué. According to UNOCI, 506 civilians were killed in this town of 70,000 inhabitants at the end of March 2011. Initially, members of the FDS, supported by Liberian mercenaries and pro-government militias, attacked civilians from northern and central Côte d'Ivoire and also Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea nationals. Later, the FRCI, supported by *dozos* (traditional hunters) entered the town on 29 March and killed civilians, especially from the Guéré ethnic group. In addition to these crimes, civilians from different origins committed crimes against each other. "Crise en Côte d'Ivoire: l'ONU réagit aux accusations d'Amnesty International", *Radio France Internationale*, 26 May 2011. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d'Ivoire, op. cit., p. 14. Crisis Group interviews, local politicians, Duékoué, May 2011.

⁶⁵ Abidjan and the rich agricultural regions of the west are important centres of employment and therefore areas of heavy immigration.

⁶⁶ In the first round of the presidential election, Laurent Gbagbo received most votes in the regions of Agnèby (74.89 per cent), Sud Comoé (55.06 per cent), Moyen Cavally (53.26 per cent) and Fromager (53.25 per cent). In the Lagunes region, which includes Abidjan, he received 45 per cent of votes and did especially well in the vast commune of Yopougon, while Alassane Ouattara won in Abobo, another very populous commune in Abidjan. Ouattara won an overwhelming victory in the northern regions of Denguélé (93.42 per cent), Worodougou (87.13 per cent), Savanes (85.90 per cent) and Bafing (73.35 per cent).

are located, is the region most immediately exposed to further clashes. An administrative official of this region told Crisis Group: "Here, we have gone from disputes of an economic nature to a real possibility of inter-ethnic clashes. We are on the brink of collapse".⁶⁷ Duékoué was the scene of murderous violence during the final weeks of the post-electoral crisis, during which time the *dozos* fighting alongside the FN (and therefore the FRCI) carried out indiscriminate and bloody reprisals against civilians of the Guéré ethnic group following terrible crimes by pro-Gbagbo militias against northern and foreign civilians.

Created on 13 May 2011, the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) has the task of promoting reconciliation. The ordinance adopted by the Council of Ministers on 13 July remains confused about the future operations of the CDVR. The ordinance does not clearly define the commission's powers and does not provide sufficient guarantees about its independence from the government. Its composition is only partly known. Its president, Charles Konan Banny, whose appointment was informally announced on 1 May and formally announced on 13 May, has a clear political affiliation. President Ouattara's decision to appoint him to the post has not met with unanimous approval.⁶⁸ Three vice-presidents will work alongside him but definitive appointments to these posts have not yet been made. The powers of the other future members of the commission seem to be limited. The 13 July ordinance seems to indicate that the President of the Republic will take the final decision on all matters, in response to proposals from the CDVR president.

If the process of reconciliation is to be successful, this ordinance requires changes. Amendments to the document should only take place after a period of structured consultation and a listening exercise that takes into account criticisms by the main civil society human rights organisations. The government should also note the opinion of West African and international non-governmental organisations with expertise on transitional justice elsewhere in the world. The commission's work must allow victims to tell their story in complete security. It must also allow opinion leaders to examine their responsibilities for this tragedy and the diverse Ivorian and for-

eign communities resident in the country to understand that the exclusion, discrimination and distrust of a group will always lead to violence. A didactic and sincere approach is required, different to the hypocrisy and ulterior motives that characterised the National Reconciliation Forum of 2001.

Finally, whatever the internal and/or external sources of funding for the commission, the government must allocate a reasonable budget and ensure financial transparency. It must be careful to avoid making the commission a source of legal or illegal enrichment for officials and expensive foreign experts who have already profited so much from budgetary crisis arrangements in recent years.

The CDVR should not assume complete responsibility for reconciliation. This is a task that cannot wait. In the coming months, the objective should be to avoid any new explosion of political and/or inter-community violence anywhere in the country, in order to avoid extending the already bloody conflict and undermining the rhetoric of reconciliation. As with the security measures, this should be mediated through the establishment of local reconciliation committees, with a major role for prefects, sub-prefects and mayors. These authorities are the first points of contact between communities. They are also the best informed about disputes that might degenerate into violence, starting with disputes over land, one of the priorities for this phase of restoring stability. However, this needs the government to provide the local authorities with the resources they need to do their work. For example, at the beginning of June, the Duékoué prefect only had one laptop at his disposal; his own.

Despite its role in exacerbating antagonisms, the media must now take on a major role in promoting reconciliation. This will need senior media figures to evaluate their role in the crisis and publicly admit that it has often been negative, if not disastrous. To this end, the media industry should be reorganised to allow the definition of new standards for public and private media and their regulatory agencies.

Finally, it is President Ouattara's job to make reconciliation the focus of his security, legal, political, social and economic policies during this period of stabilisation. It is by the yardstick of each one of these policies and practices of his government and armed forces that the sincerity of his rhetoric about reconciliation will be judged. This is all the more necessary given that he begins his term in office saddled with the image of belonging to one of the club of five politicians whose battle for power has devastated Côte d'Ivoire.⁶⁹ His management qualities and intention to govern in a radically different way from his predecessor will doubtless be useful in consolidating his authority and facilitating his ac-

⁶⁷ Crisis Group interview, Duékoué, May 2011.

⁶⁸ Charles Konan Banny is a member of the PDCI. He was prime minister from December 2005 to March 2007. He is generally considered to be the heir apparent of Henri Konan Bédié, PDCI leader. Most actors interviewed by Crisis Group, including associates of Alassane Ouattara, believe that his appointment has raised questions about the commission's impartiality. Crisis Group interviews, politicians, senior civil servants, Abidjan, May and June 2011.

⁶⁹ This club included former presidents Henri Konan Bédié, General Robert Guéi (deceased), Laurent Gbagbo, Alassane Ouattara and Guillaume Soro.

ceptance by those who have learned to detest him over the years. However, he must not neglect his duty to be compassionate towards all victims of the long crisis in which he was one of the main actors.

B. AN END TO IMPUNITY

Justice must be one of the main means of reconciliation. Too many violent crimes have been committed in Côte d'Ivoire since October 2000 when the presidential election finally allowed Laurent Gbagbo to come to power. In September 2002, the crisis reached another level with the rebellion and confrontation between armed forces that were responsible for many atrocities during and outside combat. The overwhelming majority of these crimes have remained unpunished. This impunity played an important role in the explosion of post-electoral violence.⁷⁰ In more general terms, it allowed the main perpetrators of violence to remain in the political arena and show the full extent of their capacity for harm after the second round of the election.

The national justice system put in place to judge the crimes committed after the election of 20 November 2010 currently comprises three levels. The first is civil and is the higher-level court in Abidjan. Its prosecutor, Simplicie Kouadio Koffi, appointed by the new president, is taking statements from members of the former governing party, including Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo and several other key figures of the old regime. He has announced charges against fifteen individuals for "offences against the authority of the state, undermining the sovereignty of the state, creating armed bands" and for "offences against property, to the detriment of the state and public and private financial institutions".⁷¹ The Daloa prosecutor is investigating crimes in the west, notably at Duékoué, but has not yet announced charges.

⁷⁰ The case of Duékoué is an example of this state of affairs. For several years, serial rapes occurred regularly in Duékoué and the surrounding area. In 2009, 107 rapes were reported to the local authorities. Most were committed by members of the pro-government militias that controlled the town. Judicial proceedings were opened in only a very small number of cases. Not only is the nearest court about 100km from Duékoué but the pro-government militias, armed by President Laurent Gbagbo, enjoyed total impunity. Some parents of victims have therefore carried out justice themselves, either acting alone or assisted by FRCI soldiers, and executed the individuals they believe to be responsible for these rapes. Crisis Group interviews, local authorities, local politicians, members of international NGOs and social workers, Duékoué, February 2010 and May 2011.

⁷¹ "Quinze personnalités du camp Gbagbo inculpées pour atteinte à l'autorité de l'Etat", Agence ivoirienne de presse, 27 June 2011.

The Abidjan military court, through government commissioner Ange Kessi, who was in this post under the former president, is taking statements from FDS officers who remained loyal to Laurent Gbagbo and who are suspected of having played a major role in the violence.⁷² He has announced charges against 49 military personnel for "misappropriation of public money and equipment, the sale and trade of weapons, the illegal transfer of weapons and ammunition, illegal arrests, kidnappings, murder, receiving bodies, not obeying orders and conspiracy".⁷³

The international justice system has also begun consideration of the situation. Alassane Ouattara was quick to express his desire to see the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the post-electoral period. He wrote to the ICC on 14 December 2010 recognising the jurisdiction of the court and confirming the statement issued by the Gbagbo government on 18 April 2003, also recognising this jurisdiction. Following a new written request guaranteeing cooperation between the government and the ICC, an ICC mission visited Côte d'Ivoire from 27 June to 4 July to assess the situation prior to opening an investigation. The prosecutor has formally requested the ICC judges to authorise such an investigation. The ICC, in accordance with its mandate, would only want to investigate the individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for conceiving the crimes and not, therefore, the second rank individuals responsible for carrying them out.

Despite the promises made by the authorities, national civilian and military judicial procedures remain very biased. They have so far only focused on civilian and military associates of Laurent Gbagbo. No investigation has been opened and no charges have therefore been made against FRCI soldiers. No ex-FN fighters or military leaders now in the official armed forces formed by the new president have been detained. While the civilian prosecutor remains evasive about opening proceedings against FRCI soldiers, the military prosecutor believes he cannot proceed against fighters whose military status has not yet been established.⁷⁴ In this case, such fighters can be considered to be civilians and the civil courts

⁷² According to the prosecutor of this jurisdiction, Ange Kouamé Kessi, about 20 soldiers are currently detained at Korhogo. "Pourquoi Mangou et Kassaraté sont en liberté", *Le Patriote*, 6 June 2011.

⁷³ "Enquête du parquet militaire sur les violences postélectorales: voici l'identité des 49 militaires, ex-FANCI inculpés", *Le Patriote*, 1 July 2011.

⁷⁴ On 1 July, the Abidjan prosecutor, Simplicie Kouadio Koffi, made it clear that the FRCI had "ended the violence" but that "if it transpires that those who were our saviours have exceeded their powers and committed crimes", he would "be interested in knowing about it". "Mandat d'arrêt contre Blé Goudé et d'autres pro-Gbagbo", Agence France-Presse, 1 July 2011. Also see "Situation militaire post-crise électorale, Ange-Kessi: voici pourquoi les Frci ne sont pas poursuivies", *Soir Info*, 7 July 2011.

should begin proceedings. The investigations begun by the Daloa civilian prosecutor, especially in the Duékoué region, could embarrass the president because FRCI soldiers, some of whom have no military status, participated in serious atrocities against the population.

It is imperative that President Ouattara honours his promise to end impunity. There is a clear threat from deserters who helped to defeat Gbagbo but who have also shown they have the same contempt for the lives of their fellow citizens as the army, militias and mercenaries mobilised by the former president. The report of the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d'Ivoire, undertaken at the request of the new president, describes how the FRCI, accompanied by the *dozos*, committed crimes after 28 November 2010. The confidential annex of this report even lists the names of some individuals. The authorities must now investigate these individuals, even if they are on the side of the victors, unless their crimes are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the international justice system.

The ICC's involvement represents, for the moment, the most credible promise of impartial justice. If the judges authorise the prosecutor to investigate, proceedings will largely escape the influence of Ivorian politics, even if the investigation is limited to the post-electoral period, as requested by the government. It is inconceivable that the ICC will hesitate to investigate the Duékoué killings for example, or to open proceedings against senior FRCI officers if they are implicated. However, it is desirable that President Ouattara asks the prosecutor to broaden the field of any investigation to include the presumed serious war crimes and crimes against humanity committed since September 2002. It will be difficult to investigate these crimes, especially those committed between 2002 and 2004, given the time that has elapsed. However, it would be a good thing for Côte d'Ivoire if the ICC were to signal it intends to establish the facts about events that took place prior to the post-electoral crisis.

Laurent Gbagbo's future is a great unknown because of his status as a former president, which is why he has not yet been formally charged by the Abidjan prosecutor. It has to be determined whether he was still legally President of the Republic at the time of his arrest on 11 April. The new government's position is that he was no longer president after 4 December 2010. However, even if this is so, he benefits from his status as a former head of state. He is also an ex-officio member of the Constitutional Council and cannot be charged without endorse-

ment by this superior jurisdiction, currently chaired by Francis Wodié.⁷⁵

The entire civil justice system needs to get back on its feet if impunity is to be ended. The north of the country has had no courts for eight years. In areas that remained under governmental control, judges were often appointed on the basis of ethnic and political criteria.⁷⁶ It was easy to bribe the courts to make appropriate judgements.⁷⁷ This overhaul of the system first requires the appointment of competent, honest and independent judges. It must then establish courts in areas where they did not exist as well as restore them to areas that have been the scene of violence. The Moyen Cavally region, which fulfils these two criteria, is a priority, from this point of view.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Its former president, Paul Yao N'Dré, was dismissed by presidential decree on 25 July 2011.

⁷⁶ Crisis Group interviews, civil society activist and international NGOs, February 2010 and May 2011.

⁷⁷ Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Abidjan, May 2011.

⁷⁸ See Crisis Group Report, *Côte d'Ivoire: Securing the Electoral Process*, op. cit., pp. iv and 11.

IV. CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR POLITICAL NORMALISATION

The post-electoral crisis has profoundly changed the Ivorian political map. The Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), Laurent Gbagbo's party and the main component of the Presidential Majority (LMP) under which the former president ran for re-election, has been marginalised. The FPI is divided into several tendencies: the reformist tendency embodied by the president of the old National Assembly, Mamadou Koulibaly, until his resignation in July⁷⁹ and a supporter of a self-critical reassessment of his party and a break with the Gbagbo years; and a radical tendency, tempted to forge ahead regardless, which is not even close to accepting the double electoral and military defeat it suffered and some of whose organisers in exile have vilified the new government. Targeted by an international search warrant, Charles Blé Goudé, who is not an FPI member but who was a pillar of the Gbagbo regime, has spoken to the media from exile. He accuses the Ouattara/Soro government of a drift towards dictatorship and tribalism and minimises his own side's responsibility for the post-electoral violence.

As for the leading figures of the Gbagbo regime, the former minister of the interior, Désiré Tagro, has been the main victim of the traumatic conclusion to the post-electoral arm-wrestling. He died from injuries inflicted by FRCI soldiers when they entered the presidential residence on 11 April. Many other close associates of the deposed president were mistreated before being transferred to an Abidjan hotel under UN protection or put under house arrest in the north of the country. All the former leaders of the Gbagbo regime face a wave of judicial proceedings. Many of them have denounced what is happening as a witch hunt that is incompatible with President Ouattara's stated desire for national reconciliation.

The government must avoid the temptation to use post-conflict justice to neutralise Laurent Gbagbo's party by neutralising the party organisers. The prosecutor must certainly bring charges against individuals on the basis of the evidence gathered but priority should be given to proceedings against individuals who played a direct role in committing post-electoral violence, encouraging hate, recruiting mercenaries or distributing weapons to young

civilians. More extensive proceedings against all those associated in any way with Laurent Gbagbo's abuse of power would risk dismantling the FPI and its satellites.

If the new government closes off all avenues of democratic political expression to the former president's heirs, especially the opportunity to participate in the legislative elections and then, later, local elections, the opposition will regroup and organise abroad and may form a dangerous alliance with pro-Gbagbo military figures also in exile. President Ouattara must resist influence from those who support the idea of collective punishment of the pro-Gbagbo political elite.

Guillaume Soro and the FN, military victors of the crisis and certainly enjoying decisive support from international forces, have increased their influence. The prime minister, who also holds the sensitive post of minister of defence, seems to be in a strong position and, according to some observers, is able to impose his wishes on the president.⁸⁰ However, the FN's position is fragile because it is limited in time. The end of an era is near for the area commanders. Laurent Gbagbo, the person who crystallised their revolt and helped to keep a heterogeneous rebellion together, is no longer president. They therefore have no more objective reasons to occupy half of Côte d'Ivoire and levy taxes there. In the short term, they should abandon their privileges and agree to negotiate an honourable exit. Otherwise, they risk meeting the same fate as Ibrahim Coulibaly.⁸¹ As Ivorians say, everyone must now "se chercher"; that is, focus on their own future.

The prime minister could leave the movement of which he was general secretary until July 2010.⁸² His political future is less and less tied to the FN. Once he has completed his term as prime minister, a priori after the legislative elections, he has ambitions to continue his political career. He therefore needs a party. The FN is a military movement and it would be difficult to turn it into a political party. Moreover, as the years have gone by, it has become unpopular in the regions under its control because of the heavy taxation and regular violence it imposed on the population.

Two options therefore remain for Soro. He could create his own party with the support of the loyal colleagues in his immediate entourage and try to appeal to the country's youth.⁸³

⁷⁹ Mamadou Koulibaly resigned from the FPI on 11 July 2011. "I have decided to end my association with the FPI, having exhausted all the possibilities compatible with my convictions", he declared at a press conference in Abidjan. He has decided to create his own party, Liberty and Democracy for the Republic (Liberté et démocratie pour la République – LIDER).

⁸⁰ Crisis Group interviews, politicians, diplomats, Abidjan, May 2011.

⁸¹ Ibrahim Coulibaly, alias IB, FN dissident and head of the "invisible commando" that fought Gbagbo during the post-electoral crisis, was killed in Abidjan on 27 April by FRCI soldiers.

⁸² He was replaced in this post by Mamadou Koné, who was at the time minister of justice. However, Guillaume Soro remains the real leader of the movement.

⁸³ Two men in particular have been at Guillaume Soro's side since the beginning of the rebellion: Sidiki Konaté, minister of crafts,

This would be a long-term proposition and difficult because it would require the creation of a structure strong enough to compete with opponents who have been established for a long time. He could also take a simpler option and join an existing party. The most commonly mentioned option is for him to join Alassane Ouattara's party, the RDR.⁸⁴ However, this option would give him a lot less autonomy and he would not necessarily receive a warm welcome from party members.

The Côte d'Ivoire Democratic party (PDCI), Alassane Ouattara's main ally in the RHDP, has an essential role to play in reconstructing Côte d'Ivoire. The former single party is a force for balance and stability and is present throughout the country, even though it formulated the concept of Ivoirité.⁸⁵ The PDCI has been careful to maintain its organisation since the beginning of the 2000s and avoided the polarisation between Ouattara's RDR and Gbagbo's FPI.

Ouattara would like to maintain his alliance with the PDCI for as long as possible in order to enjoy a stable majority and use its members to carry the message of reconciliation throughout the country, including in the centre-west, home of Laurent Gbagbo and many FPI activists. After the defeat of Henri Konan Bédié, who wore the PDCI's colours, in the first round of the presidential election, the party has decided to reorganise itself and a battle for its leadership may weaken it. Many observers have speculated on the possibility of a merger of the PDCI, the RDR and the smaller parties in the RHDP but this does not seem very likely in the short term.

Ouattara supports the idea of strong presidential government, apparently, in the first place, to restore the state's authority.⁸⁶ This conviction is shared by many of those close to him.⁸⁷ If he succeeds in this course of action, he runs the risk of heading a government that could

quickly remind people of the single party era, especially as the political forces of the RHDP are in the mould of Félix Houphouët-Boigny's PDCI. If the opposition has no space in which to organise, it will be forced to find refuge in extremism and go underground. President Ouattara certainly asked the FPI to participate in a government of national unity, an offer rejected by Laurent Gbagbo's party, which set various pre-conditions, including the release of the former president and his colleagues. More important than the FPI's immediate participation in a unity government is its freedom to reorganise before the legislative elections. It would be an easy option for the government to take advantage of the traumatised state of the vanquished and try to bury them, politically speaking.

The government must take the initiative and create a forum for political dialogue by inviting all parties to meetings to prepare the legislative elections. It is technically possible to hold these elections before the end of the year, the schedule also envisaged by President Ouattara. They could, given the urgency, use the electoral list compiled for the presidential election. Revision of the list, necessary in time,⁸⁸ would delay not only polling day but open the door to new and undesirable arguments in an already badly bruised country. At this still early stage of the electoral process, UNOCI could contribute by promoting political dialogue through its Special Representative, as its mandate recommends. Such a dialogue could promote an agreement between the government and all political parties about how the election should be conducted, especially the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), the electoral list and United Nations certification criteria (UN Security Council Resolution 2000 of 27 July 2000 renewed this mandate).⁸⁹

Normalisation of political life requires prompt and coordinated elections. They should adhere to the established electoral timetable. Legislative elections will also restore the legislature to its place on the political chessboard. Since his election, the president has governed by decrees and ordinances. Renewal of the National Assembly will allow the country to clarify and regenerate its political life. The RDR,

and Alain Lobognon, minister for youth promotion and civic service.

⁸⁴ On 23 June, the president of the RDR's youth movement in the Bandama Valley, Ahmadou Bamba, called on Guillaume Soro to join the RDR and become its leader. "Succession d'ADO: des militants RDR de Bouaké favorables à Soro", *L'Inter*, 24 June 2011.

⁸⁵ In the mid-1990s, Bédié and Ouattara were locked in a bitter dispute for the succession to Félix Houphouët-Boigny. In order to eliminate his opponent from the race to the presidency, Bédié formulated the concept of "Ivoirité" and his supporters based their campaign on the idea that Ouattara was from Burkina Faso and not Côte d'Ivoire. In 1995, Ouattara was excluded from the presidential election under this pretext.

⁸⁶ Alassane Ouattara defended this idea in his debate with Laurent Gbagbo on 25 November 2010.

⁸⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Ivorian politicians, May and June 2011.

⁸⁸ The list used for the 2010 presidential election would exclude people who had reached adulthood since it was compiled. In addition, it includes 5.7 million voters but the population initially targeted by the Independent Electoral Commission was 8.8 million.

⁸⁹ Certification of the presidential elections posed a lot of problems and the United Nations needs to analyse the mistakes committed in the process of certification. The very idea of a double mandate (support for the electoral process and certification of the results) should be questioned. However, it was not certification that caused the post-electoral conflict. Questioning the mandate for certification of the legislative elections could be interpreted as wanting to give a free hand to the new government and a significantly weakened electoral commission. Certification of the legislative elections must allow the inclusion of all political forces, including supporters of former president Gbagbo.

which has had no deputies since the legislative elections of December 2000 and January 2001, which it boycotted, would probably have a significant presence in the assembly. The FPI should be able to elect a minimum of representatives and actively participate in the political debate even though its chances of electing many deputies seem unlikely under current conditions. Finally, legislative elections will provide an opportunity for some FN activists, beginning with the prime minister, Guillaume Soro, to pursue a political career after the necessary dissolution of their movement. It will be up to voters to choose.

V. AN ECONOMIC EMERGENCY

For nearly six months, a blockade of the ports, paralysis of the banking system, looting and widespread destruction caused massive economic losses. Côte d'Ivoire's economy declined by 6.3 per cent in 2011.⁹⁰ However, the economy can count on its potential and attractiveness. Considered to be a competent manager and with a full address book after periods at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), President Ouattara is capable of attracting funds to revive the economy.

Moreover, it has not taken long for funds or promises of funds to reach Côte d'Ivoire, in the form of loans, donations and debt reduction.⁹¹ It is now a question of injecting these resources into labour-intensive activities. This is the best way of quickly occupying the poorly educated sectors of the male population, diverting them from using weapons and crime and gradually weaning them away from the bouts of collective mindlessness represented by ultra-nationalist mobilisations, especially in Abidjan.

Repair of the road network, which is in a very poor condition, is one of these priority activities. Three main roads are in urgent need of repair. The motorway that links Abidjan and Bouaké and then divides into two to serve the border with Burkina and the town of Korhogo needs to be completed as well as repaired.⁹² Such an initiative will also be a strong symbol of the country's reunification because it crosses the entire country. The roads that connect Yamoussoukro to Daloa and Abidjan to San Pedro must also be prioritised. The deterioration of these three roads has had a clear impact on the cost of transporting food. Their repair will not only provide work but will also boost agricultural activity. To promote job creation, Ouattara has also given instructions to recommence renovation of the Hôtel Ivoire and to build a third bridge in Abidjan, contracted to the French Bouygues group.⁹³

⁹⁰ "Après la crise, la Côte d'Ivoire anticipe une récession de 6,3% en 2011", Agence France-Presse, 23 June 2011.

⁹¹ For example, a \$200 million loan from the African Development Bank, budgetary aid of \$400 million from France through the French Development Agency (AFP), debt remission of \$2 billion from France as part of a debt reduction and development program (C2D), aid of \$129 million from the IMF under the Rapid Credit Facility, announced on 8 July 2011. "Côte d'Ivoire and ADB sign US\$200 loans and grants agreement", African Development Bank Group, 10 June 2011; "Le Jackpot du grand frère Sarko sur la lagune", *La lettre du continent*, 23 June 2010; "Le FMI offre un répit à la Grèce et à la Côte d'Ivoire", *La Croix.com*, 10 July 2011.

⁹² Part of the route exists but it is not tarmacked. The tarmacked stretch of the northern motorway ends before Yamoussoukro.

⁹³ "La reprise à tout prix", *Jeune Afrique*, 17 June 2011.

These major works should be accompanied by smaller projects, including the repair of certain symbols of the state, such as the tax collection centres, the prefectures, town halls and schools. This will create jobs but will also send a strong signal that the state intends to return to places where it has not been represented for years. The president has confirmed he is prioritising immediate economic and social projects. After announcing in March, in the middle of the post-electoral crisis, the creation of a presidential emergency program with a budget of CFA 45 billion (€68 million) for drinking water, health, education, electricity and urban sanitation projects, he gave instructions to organise a government seminar on 5-6 July to establish a roadmap for the next six months.⁹⁴

There is a clear desire to put the ministries and the entire country back to work as quickly as possible. The government's short term actions must not only seek to improve economic efficiency but must also indicate a political decision to promote reconciliation. The allocation of state resources should also benefit the places where residents were most affected by the post-electoral crisis, in the west and in the poor districts of Abidjan.

Emergency aid should be provided to internally and externally displaced people, most of whom are in the west of the country. This aid should cover their immediate needs and provide for their return home and a special fund should be created for this purpose. The construction of a refugee camp on the outskirts of Duékoué, which is due to receive the people currently staying at the catholic mission during the next few months, elicits fear that these refugees are destined to remain indefinitely in this specially built camp. The government should focus on rebuilding these people's villages and organising their rapid return home. If these people stay away from their homes for too long, other people will take over their fields, which will lead to new disputes over land.

The government must quickly recover all its tax revenues. It must dismantle the *Centrale*, the fiscal structure created by the FN to collect taxes in the northern zone. This could begin with several practical decisions concerning the double taxation still in force in Côte d'Ivoire: first, remove all checkpoints in order to facilitate free movement; second, stop FN taxes on food collected at the entrance and exit of the Bouaké wholesale market, one of the economic lungs of the centre and north; and transfer revenues from all other taxes on food markets collected by the ex-rebels to the local authorities.

Other steps to unite the tax collection system should include the FN leaving border posts in the north and the

restoration of customs posts, especially on the borders with Burkina Faso and Mali. The return of service stations to their owners by the FN, who have controlled them since the start of the crisis, would be a tangible sign that it accepts it is time to end the de facto partition of the country. Finally, the government must resume control over the diamond mining areas, which have brought billions of CFA francs to the FN for years.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ "Séminaire gouvernemental - Les attentes des Ivoiriens", *Le Nouveau Réveil*, 5 July 2011.

⁹⁵ It is difficult to assess how much the FN collect through the illegal mining of diamonds. Before the rebellion of 19 September 2002, Côte d'Ivoire produced an average of 300,000 carats per year worth about \$25 million. "Ivory Coast group wants UN flexibility on diamond ban", Reuters, 27 September 2010.

VI. CONCLUSION

However difficult the next few months prove to be, the period up to the legislative elections nevertheless represents a unique window of opportunity to start rebuilding the ties that unite Ivorian society's different communities. Côte d'Ivoire must not miss this opportunity to understand and accept the political implications of its history and geography and reject the idea that political competition is a fight to the death between opposing ethno-regionalist coalitions. If it does not, the next crisis will be bloodier than the one it has just experienced. The number of victims and therefore the desire for vengeance by part of the population has increased with every episode of unpunished political violence since the bungled succession to Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993.

In the longer term, the challenges facing the president are the same as those that Ivorian society has been unable to deal with for two decades. Knowing that the armed forces have been associated with all that has gone wrong in this period, an overhaul of the security system is indispensable for settling the conflict, as is the complete reunification of a nation that cannot continue to live with two different administrations. The work begun before the elections on the question of identity and nationality, one of the roots of the crisis, must continue. The institutional reform promised by Alassane Ouattara during the electoral campaign should open the way to changes in the constitution, which, among other weaknesses, accords the presidency too much power.

Dakar/Brussels, 1 August 2011

APPENDIX A

MAP OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE



Map No. 4312 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS
 June 2009

Department of Field Support
 Cartographic Section

APPENDIX B

ACRONYMS

AFD	Agence Française de Développement / French Development Agency
APO	Ouagadougou Political Agreement
AU	African Union
BAE	Brigade anti-émeutes / Anti-Riot Brigade
BIMa	Bataillon d'infanterie de marine / Marine Infantry Battalion
C2D	Contrat de désendettement et de développement / Debt Reduction and Development Contract
CCI	Centre de commandement intégré / Integrated Command Centre
CDVR	Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission
CECOS	Centre de commandement des opérations de sécurité / Special Security Command
CEI	Commission électorale indépendante / Independent Electoral Commission
CRS	Compagnies républicaines de sécurité, / Republican Guard, part of the national police
CSCI	Convention de la société civile ivoirienne / Ivorian Civil Society Convention
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DEMIR	Détachement mobile d'intervention rapide / Rapid Mobile Intervention Unit
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAFN	Forces armées des Forces nouvelles / Armed Forces of the New Forces
FDS	Forces de défense et de sécurité / Defence and Security Forces
FESCI	Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire
FN	Forces nouvelles / New Forces, ex-armed rebellion
FPI	Front populaire ivoirien / Ivorian Popular Front, former president Laurent Gbagbo's party
FRCI	Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LMP	La Majorité Présidentielle / The Presidential Majority, the coalition supporting Laurent Gbagbo
MFA	Mouvement des forces d'avenir / Movement for the Future
MRU	Mano River Union
PDCI	Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire / Côte d'Ivoire Democratic Party
RDR	Rassemblement des républicains / Republican Rally
RHDP	Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix / Union of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace
UDPCI	Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d'Ivoire / Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire
UN	United Nations
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in fourteen additional locations (Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Bujumbura, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and Seoul). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-

stan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.

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August 2011

APPENDIX D

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